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Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates the change in the composition of the liabilities of emerging market 
countries from primarily debt (bonds, bank loans) to equity (foreign direct investment, portfolio) 
in the decades preceding the global financial crisis. We investigate the determinants of equity 
and debt liabilities on external balance sheets in a sample of 21 emerging market economies and 
20 advanced economies over the period of 1981-2013. We use a new measure of domestic 
financial development that allows us to distinguish between financial institutions and financial 
markets. Our results show that the development of financial markets is linked to an increase in 
equity liabilities, and in particular, portfolio equity. FDI liabilities are more common when 
financial institutions are not well developed. Larger foreign exchange reserves are associated 
with larger amounts of portfolio equity. Moreover, countries with higher economic growth rates 
have larger amounts of equity liabilities. Domestic credit is inversely related to the share of 
equity in all liabilities. Foreign debt, on the other hand, is inversely related with the development 
of domestic financial markets. Larger amounts of debt liabilities are also associated with smaller 
foreign reserve holdings, lower growth rates and larger amounts of domestic credit.  
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Partners, Not Debtors: 
The External Liabilities of Emerging Market Economies 
 
1. Introduction 
 After the debt crisis of the 1980s, many emerging market nations altered the composition 
of the assets and liabilities that appear on their external balance sheets (Figure 1). The emerging 
market economies, which had obtained external funds primarily through debt in the form of 
bonds or bank loans, increasingly turned to equity, either as foreign direct investment (FDI) or 
portfolio equity, for sources of finance. As a result, their equity liabilities grew steadily, both in 
terms of magnitude and relative to their debt liabilities, and became the predominant component 
on their balance sheets. Figure 2 presents the amounts of equity and debt liabilities scaled by 
total external liabilities for a sample of 21 emerging economies during the period of 1981 
through 2013. Figure 3 shows the share of equity liabilities on their balance sheets at the 
beginning and end of this period, when the equity proportion rose from 14% to 57%. The 
advanced economies, on the other hand, continued to primarily issue debt, although there was an 
increase in their use of equity. Figure 4 presents the averages of equity and debt liabilities in a 
sample of 20 advanced economies during the same period, and Figure 5 shows the change in 
their balance sheets.1 Equity liabilities rose during this period from about 18% to 36%.  
This change in the composition of the external balance sheets of the emerging market 
nations has been widely noted (Kose and Prasad 2010). In addition, the consequences for 
economic performance of the different forms of capital have been investigated (see Section 2). 
Equity is more likely to contribute to growth, and FDI is more stable during periods of financial 
volatility than debt. However, the reasons for the transformation of the liabilities of the emerging 
markets are not well understood. 
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This paper investigates the determinants of the increase in the issuance of equity 
liabilities by emerging market economies over several decades. Our work makes several 
contributions to the literature on foreign assets and liabilities. First, we use data over a 32-year 
span (1981-2013) to track the evolution of the shift from debt to equity. Previous studies often 
used shorter time periods that did not capture the full range of the transformation. Second, we 
use a new index of domestic financial development, which allows us to distinguish between 
financial institutions and markets and their impact on external liabilities. Third, the reserves of 
foreign exchange held by the central banks of many emerging economies also rose during this 
period. We examine whether foreign reserves affected the type of liability on a country’s 
external balance sheet. Fourth, we investigate the determinants of the issuance of equity, but we 
also decompose equity to FDI and portfolio equities to see how their determinants differed. Fifth, 
we use a dynamic specification of our model. 
Our results show that the development of the domestic financial sector, and in particular 
financial markets, is linked to an increase in portfolio equity. FDI was inversely related to the 
development of financial institutions. In addition, countries with larger holdings of foreign 
exchange assets have more portfolio equity liabilities on their balance sheets. Higher economic 
growth rates are positively associated with both forms of equity. Debt, on the other hand, does 
not have a linkage with financial development, but does accompany an increase in domestic 
credit. Moreover, countries that issued debt had smaller foreign exchange holdings and lower 
growth rates. The rise in the share of equity liabilities on external balance sheets, therefore, is 
linked to increased financial development, more foreign exchange reserves, and higher growth 
rates.  
 3 
The next section of the paper reviews theoretical analyses and empirical investigations of 
the factors that can affect the composition of a country’s external liabilities. Section 3 presents 
the data and methodology to be utilized in this study, and Section 4 reports and analyzes our 
results. Section 5 presents extensions of the empirical analysis and tests of robustness. The last 
section reviews the main findings and the latest developments on the external balance sheets of 
the emerging markets.  
 
2. Analysis and Literature Review 
 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b, 2007) in a series of seminal papers provided data and 
analysis on the external assets and liabilities of a wide range of countries. They pointed out that 
the pace of international financial integration, as measured by the amount of foreign assets and 
liabilities scaled by GDP, was more gradual in emerging markets and developing countries than 
the increase in the advanced economies. They also noted that the share of the emerging markets 
nations’ foreign liabilities held in the form of debt peaked in the mid-1980s and then fell as the 
share of equity—primarily FDI (see Figure 6)—rose. The increase in equity liabilities coincided 
with an increase in external assets held as debt and foreign exchange reserves (primarily U.S. 
Treasury bonds), a profile called “long debt, short equity.” The advanced economies, on the 
other hand, held larger proportions of their assets in the form of equity while their liabilities were 
predominantly debt, a profile of “long equity, short debt.” 
 A number of studies have demonstrated that the configuration of external balance sheets 
affects economic performance during periods of volatility.2  Lane (2013) has claimed that the 
composition of the emerging markets’ foreign assets and liabilities served as a buffer against the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09, while the contrasting profile of advanced economies’ 
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balance sheets heightened their vulnerability. Similarly, Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010) 
have maintained that the U.S. provides “insurance” to other countries against the effects of a 
crisis through its holdings of their equities. The decline in equity values raised the net 
international investment position of those countries that had issued equity liabilities, while 
lowering the international positions of those what held the equity. 
The role of external balance sheets in transmitting the effects of the GFC has been 
investigated in several empirical studies. Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) measured the 
wealth transfers that took place during the GFC. Joyce (2015) reported that countries with 
primarily FDI liabilities had higher growth rates, fewer bank crises and were less likely to 
borrow from the IMF during the GFC. Countries that entered the crisis with relatively more debt 
liabilities on their external balance sheets had more bank crises and were more likely to use IMF 
credit. Similarly, Al-Saffar, Ridinger and Whitaker (2013) found that external debt liabilities 
contributed to the deviation of GDP in 2009 from its 1997-2007 trend. These results match those 
of earlier studies that found that equity and debt liabilities have different impacts on the 
probabilities of financial crises. 
Several theoretical models have been offered to explain the difference in the composition 
of external asset and liability holdings between the advanced and emerging countries. Many of 
these have focused on the size and features of their financial systems. Mendoza, Quadrini and 
Ríos-Rull (2009), for example, presented a model in which countries differ by the degree of 
enforcement of financial contracts. Residents of countries with financial markets with better 
security provisions invest in the high-return but relatively risky equity issued by countries with 
less developed financial markets, which in turn hold the debt issued by the countries with 
developed financial markets.  
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Similarly, Devereux and Sutherland (2009) offered a model of capital flows in which 
emerging markets foster international risk sharing by holding international bonds while selling 
equity claims to advanced economies. Mendoza and Smith (2014) analyzed the impact of 
financial crises on the holdings of equity and bonds in emerging markets with financial frictions. 
A financial crisis that follows financial liberalization in an emerging economy will induce 
domestic agents to rebalance their portfolios towards less equity and more risk-free bonds. 
Vermuelen and de Haan (2014) undertook an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between financial development and net asset positions in 50 countries over the period of 1970-
2007. They used the ratio of credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial 
institutions scaled by GDP as their measure of financial development. They reported that 
financial development resulted in higher net equity and lower net debt positions, which they 
interpreted as confirmation of the model of Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2009). 
Other empirical studies have concentrated on the role of financial reforms and institutions 
in attracting equity, and these have indicated that emerging markets draw foreign equity 
investors when their domestic financial markets have been strengthened. Faria et al. (2007), for 
example, examined the share of equity in the composition of the external liabilities of 74 
countries in two years, 1996 and 2004. They reported that financial reform increased the 
issuance of equity over time, while better institutional quality, as measured by the World Bank 
Governance Indicators, was a significant factor in increasing equity liabilities in their cross-
country results. Faria and Mauro (2009) also found in another empirical study that included 22 
advanced and 72 emerging and developing economies that the share of equity in external 
liabilities was associated with better institutional quality.  
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There are also studies that distinguish among FDI, portfolio equity and debt. Smith and 
Valderrama (2009) offer a model that features a cyclical pattern in the different types of capital 
inflows. Debt and portfolio equity finance domestic investment in the initial stages of a business 
cycle, and are followed by FDI. Ju and Wei (2010) compare developed countries with efficient 
financial systems and strong property rights with emerging market economies that have weak 
financial systems and intermediate levels of property rights. In their model the latter countries 
export financial capital but are net issuers of FDI.  
Similarly, Wei (2006) in an empirical analysis examined how financial and institutional 
development affects the composition of external liabilities in 94 countries in 2003. He found that 
corruption led to smaller stocks of FDI and portfolio debt, but more foreign loans. Financial 
development, as measured by the sum of the ratios of stock market capitalization and private 
sector credit to GDP, boosted the issuance of portfolio equity and discouraged FDI. 
The empirical studies cited above often concentrated on the relative share of a class of 
liabilities, such as equity. Other empirical analyses of balance sheets have focused on the 
determinants of the different foreign liabilities as proportions of GDP. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2001a), for example, reported results for both specifications in their analysis of the liabilities of 
22 industrial and 121 developing economies in 1997. They found that FDI as a proportion of 
GDP was related positively to trade openness in both groups of countries, as was debt; however, 
the ratio of equity to debt responded positively to trade openness in the developing countries, 
indicating that the impact on equity was greater than the effect on debt. The capitalization of a 
country’s stock market increased FDI in the industrial countries and portfolio equity in all the 
countries, and a rise in the equity/debt ratio in the industrial countries.  
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Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) reported similar results in a study of 22 industrial and 
45 developing economies. Trade openness increased FDI and portfolio equity liabilities in the 
developing economies as well as the equity/debt ratio. Larger developing economies were more 
likely to issue portfolio equity.  
Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli (2012) investigated the amounts of FDI, portfolio equity 
and debt liabilities scaled by GDP for 70 countries in 2007. Trade openness contributed to FDI 
but lowered the use of debt. GDP per capita was positively associated with portfolio equity but 
inversely related to FDI per capita. Financial development contributed to an increase in the 
issuance of portfolio equity. 
The evidence on the impact of financial development on the issuance of equity liabilities, 
therefore, is mixed. While Vermuelen and de Haan (2014) found that financial development was 
inversely linked to the issuance of equity, Faria et al. (2007) reported that financial reform 
contributed to an increase in the share of equity on a country’s external balance sheet. When FDI 
and portfolio equity are treated separately, several authors (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001a, Wei 
2006, Daude and Fratzscher 2008, Furceri and Guichard 2012) find that financial development 
leads to the issuance of more portfolio equity.  
 Our research, therefore, builds on this previous work in several dimensions. First, our 
sample period, which begins in 1980 and extends through 2013, is longer than those of many 
earlier studies. Second, we examine whether a central bank’s holdings of foreign reserves affect 
the type of liability of its external balance sheet. Third, we use a new measure of financial 
development. Fourth, we investigate the linkage of financial development with equity, both as an 
aggregate as well as with its components. We also look at other possible determinants of the 
composition of external liabilities, including trade and financial openness.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
We obtained data for 41 countries, which included 21 emerging market economies and 20 
advanced economies, over the period of 1981 through 2013. The emerging market economies 
included nations that became integrated into global capital markets during this time period. We 
based our choice on the nations listed in the MSCI Emerging Market Index, and those included 
in the emerging market category in Kose, Ortok and Prasad’s (2012) study of global business 
cycles.3  We did not include small financial centers with oversized financial holdings (Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore) or those with populations below one million. 
We also excluded the countries that became market economies in the wake of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, as their financial data commence in the 1990s and do not include the earlier 
period when debt liabilities were more common. The countries included in the sample are listed 
in Appendix 1. 
The data on external assets and liabilities were taken from the latest version of the 
“External Wealth of Nations” dataset, which was constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007).4 We use the value of all equity liabilities scaled by total liabilities and multiplied by 100 
(EqL/Lbt). We also use its components, FDI and portfolio equity liabilities (FDIL/Lbt, PrtL/Lbt), 
similarly measured, as well as debt liabilities (DbtL/Lbt). 
Many of the models described above point to the accumulation of safe, foreign assets as 
the impetus behind the issuance of equity by emerging market countries. The increase in foreign 
exchange reserves to serve as self-insurance against capital outflows has been widely noted 
(Aizenman and Lee 2007). Therefore, we include the value of foreign exchange scaled as a 
percentage of GDP on a country’s external balance sheet as a possible determinant (Fr Res/Y).  
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Financial development has often been measured by the amount of credit extended to the 
private sector, as explained above. However, there are limitations to this measure. The amount of 
private credit is also used as a measure of speculative activity in studies of financial crises, and 
does not reflect the strength and breadth of domestic financial institutions. Our primary measure 
of financial development, therefore, is an index recently released at the IMF, which was designed 
to capture the multidimensional nature of the development of financial institutions and markets.5 
The index ranges between zero and one, with greater values associated with higher development. 
The coverage includes 183 countries during the period of 1980 and 2013.  
Svirydzenka (2016) provides a description of the index:  
Financial institutions include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
pension funds. Financial markets include stock and bond markets. Financial 
development is defined as a combination of depth (size and liquidity of markets), 
access (ability of individuals and companies to access financial services), and 
efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with 
sustainable revenues, and the level of capital markets). 
We use the data on overall financial development (Fin Dev) and also its two 
subcomponents, financial institutions (Fin Inst) and financial markets (Fin Mar).6 Figure 7 shows 
the average values of the Financial Development Index for the emerging markets and advanced 
economies in our sample. Financial development has advanced much further in the advanced 
economies, but has not risen in either group of countries since 2007. Figure 8 shows the values 
of the two-subcomponent indexes for the emerging markets. The development of financial 
markets caught up with that of financial institutions in these nations during the 1990s before 
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falling below during the global financial crisis. We also include private sector credit scaled by 
GDP (Dom Cr/Y) in the analysis for comparison. 
The control variables are taken from the literature on capital flows and stocks.7  They 
include several measures of the economy of the host country: the logarithm of each country’s 
GDP measured in current dollars (Ln(Y)); the logarithm of GDP per capita, as measured in 
constant 2010 dollars, (Ln(Y/Pop)); and the annual growth rate of real GDP (%ΔY). There are 
measures related to the openness of the economy: trade openness as measured by exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP (Trd Open) and financial openness, the sum of foreign assets 
and liabilities also scaled by GDP (Fin Open). In addition, the yield on U.S. Treasury notes (US 
Tr 10) is included to account for foreign “push” variables. A list of all the variables, their sources 
and descriptive statistics appears in Appendices 2 and 3.  
In the estimation we use a specification that included a lagged dependent variable: 𝑌!,! = 𝛼𝑌!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐹𝑅!,! +   𝛾!𝐹𝐷!,! + 𝛿!𝑋!,! + 𝜇!,!                                                                                                                    (1) 
where  Yi,t = measure of external liabilities  
FRi,t = foreign reserves 
FDi,t = measure of financial development 
X i,t = control variables  
 µi,t = error term  
 i = country, t = time period 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable can be related to the adjustment 
parameter in a partial adjustment model:                                                                                                               𝐴  ! −   𝐴!!! =   𝜆 𝐴!∗ −   𝐴!!!                                                                         (2)                             
where A* = the long-run level of a variable 
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λ = the parameter of adjustment between the actual value of At  and its long-run level 
The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, α, is equal to (1-λ). Since our 
dependent variables are stock variables, we expect slow adjustment parameters. 
Because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable, ordinary least squares 
estimates would be inconsistent. In addition, there is possible endogeneity among the regressors. 
In order to address these concerns, we use the generalized methods of moments system estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The equation is transformed by taking first differences, and the lagged dependent 
variables and the endogenous regressors are instrumented with their lagged levels as well as any 
exogenous variables. Since the lagged levels may be poor instruments, the system estimator also 
includes the equation in levels, and these variables can be instrumented with their first 
differences. The U.S. 10-year Treasury bond rate is treated as exogenous, and therefore also 
serves as an instrument. 
The test statistics include the results of tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation in 
the differences. Negative first-order serial correlation is expected in the differences, so the 
appropriate test for first-order correlation in levels is for second-order correlation in the 
differences. The probability value of the Hansen test statistic of the over-identification 
restrictions is also reported. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the results of our estimation of the determinants of equity liabilities as a 
proportion of all liabilities for the full sample of countries. The test statistics indicate that we 
cannot reject first-order autocorrelation as expected, but we can reject second-order 
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autocorrelation. The values of the Hansen test statistics indicate that the over-identification 
restrictions are valid. 
We discuss first the results for the lagged dependent and control variables. The lagged 
dependent variable is significant at the 1% level in all estimations, and ranges in value from 0.91 
to 0.96. The average value is 0.94, which yields an adjustment parameter to the long-run value of 
equity liabilities/GDP of only 0.06. This result is due in part to the stock nature of the data, 
which changes slowly over time. 
The value of the coefficient on the logarithm of GDP is negative and significant at the 
10% or higher levels in four estimations. This is consistent with the profile of the emerging 
market countries as “short equity,” as opposed to the larger, more advanced economies. The 
growth rate of GDP, on the other hand, is positive and highly significant in all the estimations, 
with an average coefficient value of 0.183. A one percent rise in growth, therefore, is associated 
with an increase in the share of equity liabilities in all liabilities of about 0.2 of a percentage 
point.  
The U.S. Treasury rate has a negative coefficient with an average value of 0.25 that is 
significant in two equations at the 1% level. A one percent rise in the U.S. rate lowers the 
proportion of equity liabilities by a quarter of a percentage point. This finding may reflect not 
only the impact of the rise in the foreign rate on the willingness of foreign investors to hold the 
equity of emerging market economies, but domestic rates as well if they are tied to the U.S. rate 
(see discussion of Table 7 below).  
In addition, the coefficient on the foreign exchange variable is positive and significant at 
the 5% or 1% level in all six equations. A one percent increase in the ratio of foreign exchange to 
GDP leads to an average rise of 0.107 in the percentage share of equity liabilities in all liabilities. 
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This result is consistent with the hypothesis that countries issued equity liabilities to acquire risk-
free foreign assets.  
In terms of financial development, the domestic credit variable has a highly significant 
negative coefficient in equation 1.1. In equation 1.2 we replace it with the IMF’s financial 
development variable. Its coefficient is positive and significant at the one percent level: countries 
with more financial development have more equity liabilities. If we convert the index’s 0-1 scale 
to 0-100 range, then a one-point rise in the index raises the equity share of total liabilities by 
0.10. In equation 1.3, we substitute for overall financial development with one of its two 
components, the financial institutions measure. This variable has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. In equation 1.4, we include the financial markets variable and find a positive and 
highly significant coefficient that is similar in value to the coefficient on overall financial 
development (9.34 vs. 9.74). In equation 1.5, we include both components of financial 
development. In this specification, the negative coefficient on financial institutions is significant 
at the 10% level, while the financial markets measure continues to have a positive and highly 
significant impact. We add domestic credit in the last equation, and it is significant with a 
negative coefficient. Since we control for financial development, the impact of domestic credit 
on the issuance of equity must come through another channel, and we explore this below. 
Equity liabilities held by foreigners, therefore, are more common when there are 
developed domestic financial markets. These are essential if foreign firms and individuals intend 
to purchase domestic shares either for a business acquisition or their portfolios. They also 
provide liquidity for future exit. Financial institutions, however, are not linked to the proportion 
of equity liabilities. 
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We next repeat the estimations using the specification of the empirical analysis reported 
in the first table but confine our sample to the 21 emerging market economies. These results 
appear in Table 2. These results are similar in many aspects to the results in Table 1, which is not 
surprising since the emerging market economies dominated the sample. The lagged dependent 
variable has positive and significant coefficients, with a slightly lower average value of 0.893 
and an adjustment parameter of 0.107. Economic growth and foreign reserves again have 
positive and highly significant coefficients. The significance of the coefficients associated with 
GDP and the U.S. Treasury rate falls in some instances. Domestic credit again has a negative and 
significant coefficient. But the overall financial development variable and the financial markets 
variable again have positive and highly significant impacts, which are larger than those in the 
previous table. The emerging market countries with relatively more developed financial markets 
record more equity liabilities.  
In Table 3, we use FDI liabilities scaled by total liabilities in the full sample as our 
dependent variable. Since FDI represents the larger share of the equity liabilities in the emerging 
market economies, it is not surprising that the coefficients are often similar to those reported in 
Table 1. However, there are differences. First, the lagged dependent variable has point estimates 
slightly above 1.00, indicating a high degree of inertia associated with the higher stability of FDI, 
as well as the possibility of omitted determinants. Second, the coefficients on GDP are 
insignificant in five of the six estimations. Smaller economies may have no advantage in 
attracting FDI. However, economic growth is significant in drawing FDI, as is was for all equity 
liabilities. Third, the negative coefficient of U.S. Treasury rate is significant at the 5% or 1% 
levels in only two of the five equations. Fourth, the foreign exchange variable is not significant 
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here. The issuance of FDI liabilities may be undertaken for other reasons than the acquisition of 
safe foreign assets. 
The domestic credit variable has a negative and significant coefficient, as in Table 1. But 
the financial development variable in the following equation is no longer significant. However, 
the financial institutions variable has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level in 
equations 3.3 and 3.6 and at the 5% level in equation 3.5. FDI is more common when financial 
institutions are not well developed, and may afford local entrepreneurs an alternative source of 
finance. This is consistent with the theories that predict that equity liabilities are more common 
in the absence of financial development if we consider the development of financial institutions 
as the relevant financial variable. On the other hand, the coefficient on financial markets is 
positive but insignificant in equation 3.4 and significant at the 10% and 5% levels in the last two 
estimation equations. The difference in signs between the two components of financial 
development explains the insignificance of financial development itself. Domestic credit again 
has a negative and significant impact. 
Table 4 reports the result for the FDI liabilities within the emerging market sample, and 
these results are also broadly similar to those in the preceding table. However, one new result is 
that financial openness as measured by foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP has a 
negative coefficient that is significant in three cases. FDI, therefore, may be a substitute for other 
international financial flows when domestic financial institutions and markets are not equipped 
to handle them. Financial development overall is insignificant. The coefficients of the financial 
institutions variable are again negative and significant at the 5% level in two equations, while the 
financial markets variable has a positive coefficient significant at the 10% level in only one 
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equation. The evidence shows that FDI is more common in the absence of well-developed 
domestic intermediaries that can channel credit to domestic firms.  
In Tables 5 and 6, we use the share of portfolio equity in all liabilities as the dependent 
variable, and these results diverge from the FDI results in several dimensions. First, the lagged 
dependent variable coefficient is lower than those reported in the previous two tables. The 
average value of that coefficient is 0.81, which yields a partial adjustment parameter of 0.19, 
reflecting the more liquid nature of portfolio investments. Second, the coefficient of the 
logarithm of GDP is negative and significant at the 10% or 5% levels in five equations; a larger 
share of portfolio equity liabilities is associated with smaller economies. This result is the source 
of the negative linkage of all equity liabilities and GDP reported in Table 1. The growth rate of 
GDP, however, continues to have positive and significant coefficients.  
Third, the foreign exchange variable has positive and significant coefficients in all the 
estimation equations: foreign reserves are associated with more portfolio equity, which drives the 
results for a positive relationship with all equity in Table 1. This result is consistent with Qian 
and Steiner’s (2014) finding that foreign reserves raised the share of foreign portfolio equity 
investment in the stock of all foreign equity investment. They present a model that includes a 
risk premium on portfolio equity that reflects foreign investors’ concerns of currency 
devaluation. Larger holdings of reserves reduce this risk premium, and therefore increase the 
holdings of portfolio equity.  
The negative coefficient of the domestic credit variable is initially not significant. 
However, the financial development variable appears in equation 5.2 with a positive and highly 
significant coefficient, as do financial institutions and markets when they appear separately in 
equations 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. However, when both components of financial development 
 17 
are used in equation 5.5, it is the coefficient for financial markets that retains its significance at 
the 1% level. Similarly, when domestic credit is added in equation 5.6, financial markets 
continue to have a positive and significant impact on the issuance of portfolio equity, while the 
domestic credit variable now has a highly significant negative coefficient.  
More developed financial markets facilitate more external equity holdings, in part by 
providing liquidity to foreign investors. In a similar result, Qian and Steiner (2014) found that 
stock market capitalization raised the share of portfolio equity in all equity liabilities. Several of 
the studies cited in Section 2 (Daude and Fratzscher (2008), Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli 
(2012), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), Wei (2006)) also reported evidence of positive 
linkages between financial development and the holdings of portfolio liabilities by foreign 
investors.   
We can compare the determinants of portfolio equity liabilities within emerging markets 
with those for the full sample, and those results appear in Table 6. In these estimations, GDP no 
longer has significant coefficients. In addition, the coefficient on foreign exchange is still 
positive but significant at only the 10% level. The results in the previous table may reflect the 
range of differences between advanced and emerging market economies that diminish when only 
the latter group is considered. On the other hand, financial development retains its significant 
positive impact in equation 6.2. The results for financial institutions and markets in the following 
equations again show that this result is due to the role of financial markets in promoting portfolio 
equity investment, as its coefficient again has positive coefficients that are significant at the 1% 
level in equations 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.   
We next examine the determinants of debt liabilities, and these results are reported for the 
full sample in Table 7. They are of course the opposite of those for the equity liabilities, but 
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several are worth noting. First, the values for the lagged dependent variable’s coefficients are 
higher than those for portfolio equity, implying a smaller partial adjustment parameter. Second, 
the coefficients of GDP are positive but only significant at the 5% level in one estimation. Larger 
economies may been more likely to issue debt than smaller economies, consistent with the “short 
debt” profile of advanced economies. Third, economic growth has negative and significant 
coefficient estimates. Economies that have been growing more slowly are more likely to have 
debt liabilities, possibly because their return on equity will be lower. Third, the U.S. Treasury 
rate has positive coefficients that are significant at the 10% or 5% levels in five equations. If 
domestic rates are tied to a global rate such as the U.S. rate, then domestic debt will also yield a 
higher return when U.S. rates rise, which may attract foreign investors.8 Fourth, the foreign 
exchange variable has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level in three 
estimations and at 5% or 1% level in the last two. Countries with less foreign exchange reserves 
issue more debt.  
The domestic credit variable is highly significant in equation 7.1. The issuance of debt to 
foreign lenders takes place when the extension of domestic credit to private borrowers has risen. 
Our results is consistent with several studies, such as those of Caballero (2014) and Lane and 
McQuade (2014), that have shown that debt inflows are linked to the growth of domestic credit, 
and often more bank crises.  
The financial development variable, on the other hand, has a negative coefficient that is 
highly significant. When this variable is decomposed into financial institutions and markets, it is 
the lack of development of financial markets that explain this finding. Financial markets are less 
developed in countries that issue primarily debt. The domestic credit variable retains its highly 
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positive significant variable in the last equation; the channel of transmission is clearly not 
through financial development that also appears in the equation. 
Similar findings are found in the results for the debt liabilities for the emerging market 
sample reported in Table 8. Debt liabilities, therefore, are more likely to be issued when a 
country is larger, has a lower growth rate, smaller foreign exchange reserves, and has recorded a 
rise in domestic credit. Financial development as manifested through financial markets is 
inversely related to the share of debt liabilities. In addition, a rise in U.S. interest rates is 
consistent with more external debt. 
We can summarize the main results between countries that have recorded relatively more 
equity liabilities versus those with more debt. First, higher rates of economic growth are 
associated with relatively more equity liabilities. Second, equity liabilities are positively linked 
to foreign exchange reserves, while the opposite is true for debt. Third, domestic credit levels are 
inversely related to the share of equity in total liabilities, reflecting the linkage with debt. Fourth, 
financial development as measured by the IMF’s new index, and in particular financial markets, 
contributes to more equity. If we differentiate between FDI and portfolio equity, other 
differences emerge. Portfolio equity is positively linked to foreign exchange reserves, but not 
FDI. FDI, on the other hand, is inversely related to the development of financial institutions. 
We can compare these results with those reported when we use a different specification 
for the dependent variable: the ratio of equity liabilities to debt liabilities on the external balance 
sheet. We use the same control variables for comparison, and these results are reported in Table 
9. Countries with relatively more equity liabilities on their balance sheets have higher economic 
growth rates, more foreign exchange reserves, less domestic credit but more developed financial 
markets (but not institutions). There is also some evidence that more equity is linked to lower 
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GDP, declining U.S. interest rates and financial openness. Most of these results recur when the 
estimations are done only for the emerging markets sample, as shown in Table 10. However, the 
coefficients of GDP , the U.S. Treasury rate and financial openness are generally insignificant. 
These empirical characteristics are consistent with the experience of emerging markets 
over recent decades. These countries recorded rising growth rates in the 1990s and 2000s, 
particularly in recent decades. They accumulated large amounts of foreign reserves, particularly 
after the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The growth of their financial markets as they deregulated their 
financial sectors and became integrated into global financial markets attracted the interest of 
foreign investors, who seek higher returns from equity when domestic returns are low.  
 
5. Extensions and Robustness  
We sought to establish the robustness of our results by adding other variables that may 
have affected the relative composition of the liabilities that appear on external balance sheets. 
We retained the financial markets index, as it was the most robust measure of financial 
development. We first added two macroeconomic policy variables: inflation (Inf), measured as 
the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, and government consumption expenditures 
as a proportion of GDP (Gov C/Y), multiplied by 100. 
We also used two policy regime variables. The first is the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) 
measure of exchange rate regimes (Ex Reg), which ranges on a scale from one to 15 with higher 
values indicating more flexible regimes.9 The other policy regime variable is a measure of capital 
account openness introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006). The index (Cap Acc) is based on the data 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
regarding the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current and capital account 
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transactions, and requirements of export proceeds. Chinn and Ito calculate the first principal 
component of the data reported for each country to construct an index, where higher values 
denote fewer regulations.10    
We included a measure of the risk to investments as reported by the PRS Group in its 
International Country Risk Guide. This is based on three subcomponents: contract 
viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payments delays. The index ranges from zero to 
twelve points, with more points indicating less risk. Finally, we used a dummy variable for the 
occurrence of bank crises, using the dates reported in the Laeven and Valencia (2012) database 
of financial crises. 
The results for the full sample are reported in Table 11, and confirm the importance of 
financial markets for equity. The variable retains its positive coefficient, which is significant at 
the 1% levels in all estimations. GDP growth is positive and highly significant, as are central 
bank holdings of foreign reserves. Domestic credit continues to have significant negative impact. 
The inflation and government spending variables are not significant here, nor is the 
indicator of capital account openness. The exchange rate regime variable has a negative 
coefficient significant at the 10% level, implying that equity is more common with less flexible 
exchange rate regime. This would be consistent with the fixed exchange rate policies of many 
emerging market economies.   
The ICRG’s investment risk policy has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% 
level. Why would equity liabilities be more common on the external balance sheets of countries 
considered to be more risky? The emerging market economies do not have the same level of 
investor protection as do the advanced economies, but they were able to issue equity liabilities to 
foreign investors in countries with more security, as the models summarized in Section II predict.  
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The bank crisis variable has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. 
Equity investors are less interested in those countries where bank failures have been more 
common. However, this finding may also reflect the positive linkage of external debt liabilities 
and the occurrence of bank crises (Joyce 2011).  
When the same estimations are performed for the emerging market sample, the results, 
reported in Table 12, for the main variables of interest (foreign reserves, financial markets) are 
similar. The exchange rate regime variable is now significant at the 5% level, while the index of 
capital account openness is positive and highly significant. Equity liabilities are relatively more 
common in emerging market economies when there is a fixed exchange rate regime and an 
unregulated capital account. However, the investment risk and bank crises variables are no 
longer significant. 
We added other “push” variables to the estimation, such as world economic growth. We 
also used other domestic “pull” variables, such as the rents from natural resources. However, 
none of these were significant, and they did not change the results for the financial development 
variables. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper for the determinants of the transformation of the 
liabilities of the emerging market economies in recent decades from predominantly debt to 
equity finance is consistent in part with recent theoretical models. Those nations that issued 
relatively more equity to foreign investors, and particularly investors in portfolio equity, 
recorded larger amounts of foreign reserves, as the models predicted. Conversely, countries with 
less foreign reserve assets issued debt. 
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However, the relationship of financial development and the equity/debt mix is more 
complicated. Countries with more developed financial markets issued more portfolio equity 
liabilities. On the other hand, countries with less developed financial institutions had more FDI. 
Overall, there was a positive linkage of financial development and the use of equity liabilities, 
which is not what some models predict.  
Other variables contributed to the rise in the use of equity. During the period under 
review, the use of equity was associated with higher growth rates, which could make projects 
funded with the foreign funds more profitable. The amount of domestic credit extended to the 
private sector was inversely related to the relative use of equity, which is consistent with the 
linkage of debt with the growth of domestic credit.   
One policy implication of our results is that the development of financial markets leads to 
more foreign holdings of portfolio equity. However, whether or not this is a development that 
should be desired depends on how the additional source of funds affects the economy. They may 
contribute to development by increasing the amount of external funds available for firms as well 
as contributing to increased liquidity. On the other hand, portfolio holdings are more likely than 
FDI to be withdrawn in the event of financial volatility, thereby exacerbating the instability. The 
authorities may want to control the amount of portfolio inflows until the domestic markets are 
robust enough to handle them.  
Since the financial crisis, the relative shares of equity and debt on the external balance 
sheets of emerging market economies have fluctuated very little (see Figure 2). Private firms in 
some of these countries have issued more bonds. Avdjiev, Chui and Shin (2014) have estimated 
that between 2009 and 2013, non-financial corporations in emerging markets issued $554 billion 
of international debt securities. Chang, Fernández and Gulan have studied this phenomenon, and 
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present a model in which increased issuance of bonds reflects lower world interest rates but 
relatively more expensive bank finance. The Committee on International Economic Policy and 
Reform (2015) has drawn attention to this development, and noted that many of these bonds 
were denominated in foreign, principally dollar, denominations. The legacy of this foreign 
borrowing, therefore, will be a heightened sensitivity to international volatility. 
Moreover, the composition of foreign assets by emerging market economies has been 
shifting. Emerging market governments are allowing their firms and individuals to hold assets in 
other markets, both advanced and emerging (Karolyi, Ng and Prasad 2013). China, for example, 
has become an exporter of FDI, particularly to developing countries (Aizenman, Jinjanarak and 
Zheng (2015).  
Therefore, the composition of both sides of the external balance sheets of emerging 
market economies may be changing. This reflects in part their own development, as domestic 
firms in emerging markets borrow in international capital markets while seeking opportunities 
for expansion in other countries. These changes, however, will make their external balance 
sheets more pro-cyclical and vulnerable to external shocks. Whether or not this represents a 
short-term response to extraordinarily low interest rates or an inflection point will require 
additional new analysis and investigation. 
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NOTES 
 
1 External balance sheets also record derivative assets and liabilities. The majority of the 
emerging market economies in our sample, however, did not hold or issue any derivatives, and 
those with derivatives held or issued small amounts and often only towards the end of our sample 
period. Therefore we did not include them in our empirical analysis. 
2 Levy Yeyati and Zúñiga (2015) provide a review and analysis of the recent literature on the 
effects of the different types of capital flows. 
3 Several of the economies (Israel, Mexico, South Korea) are now members of the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is usually considered to be an 
organization of upper-income countries. However, they were not OECD members for most of the 
sample period, and therefore we included them in the emerging market sample.  
4 The dataset is available at: http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html 
5 The dataset is available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43621.0 
6 There are also subindexes of depth, access and efficiency in financial institutions and markets.    
7 The literature on the determinants of capital flows has been surveyed by Montiel (2014) and 
Koepke (2015).  
8 See Chin and Frankel (1995) on the influence of U.S. interest rates on Asian countries.  
9 The latest data are available at:  
 http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/. 
10 The latest data are available at: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. 
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Figure 1 
External Balance Sheet 
 
   Assets     Liabilities 
   Equity (FDI, Portfolio)F    Equity (FDI, Portfolio)D 
+ Debt (Bonds, Bank Loans)F + Debt (Bonds, Bank Loans)F/D 
+ Foreign Exchange Reserves F  
 
Foreign Assets of Domestic Residents - Domestic Liabilities of Foreign Residents = 
  
Net International Investment Position (+ creditor, - debtor) 
 
Note: F identifies assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency, D denominated in 
domestic currency, F/D denominated in foreign or domestic currency. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities vs. Debt Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Emerging Markets 
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Figure 3 
Composition of Liabilities: 
Emerging Markets, 1981 vs. 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities vs. Debt Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Advanced Economies 
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Figure 5 
Composition of Liabilities: 
Advanced Economies, 1981 vs. 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
FDI Liabilities/Total Liabilities vs. Portfolio Equity Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies 
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Figure 7 
Financial Development: 
Advanced Economies vs. Emerging Market Economies 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Financial Institutions vs. Financial Markets: 
Emerging Market Economies 
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Table 1 
Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
EqL/Lbt (-1) 0.93*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln( Y) -0.69 -2.11** -1.53* -2.25** -1.83** -0.65 
 (0.67) (0.92) (0.86) (0.89) (0.87) (0.73) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.41 -0.11 0.30 -0.30 0.59 -0.17 
 (0.58) (0.63) (0.66) (0.59) (0.65) (0.80) 
%ΔY 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trd Open 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Fin Open 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.43*** -0.22 -0.40*** -0.25 -0.26* -0.20 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) 
Fr Res/Y 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.05***     -0.07*** 
 (0.01)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  9.89***     
  (3.39)     
Fin Inst   -0.86  -6.13* -2.22 
   (3.11)  (3.69) (4.27) 
Fin Mar    9.76*** 9.70*** 10.83*** 
    (2.21) (2.08) (2.41) 
Constant 27.62 55.25** 41.06* 62.85*** 46.37** 23.72 
 (18.68) (24.43) (23.92) (23.34) (23.50) (20.30) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.22 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.24 
Hansen 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.73 0.91 
N 1,279 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,279 
 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/Population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the U.S. 10-year Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 2 
Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies, 1981-2013 
 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) 
EqL/Lbt (-1) 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ln(Y) 0.79 -1.89* 0.13 -1.44** -0.69 0.71 
 (1.13) (1.05) (1.12) (0.74) (0.93) (1.05) 
Ln(Y/Pop) 0.17 0.77 2.00 1.05 1.82 0.22 
 (1.62) (1.42) (1.28) (1.39) (1.30) (1.69) 
%ΔY 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Trd Open 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Fin Open 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.23 -0.43** -0.33* -0.33* -0.26 -0.08 
 (0.24) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.24) 
Fr Res/Y 0.18** 0.16** 0.19** 0.15** 0.15** 0.12* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.06***     -0.08*** 
 (0.02)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  16.54***     
  (5.39)     
Fin Inst   -5.85  -6.56 -3.33 
   (4.82)  (5.20) (4.51) 
Fin Mar    14.46*** 14.63*** 16.76*** 
    (3.07) (2.60) (2.64) 
Constant -17.54 44.80 -13.07 32.39 8.32 -16.45 
 (36.14) (29.73) (35.83) (21.86) (28.12) (32.82) 
 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.99 0.98 0.98 
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 662 672 672 672 672 662 
 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the U.S. 10-year Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 3 
FDI Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 
FDIL/Lbt (-1)_ 1.01*** 1.03*** 1.01*** 1.03*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(Y) -0.32 -0.73 -0.35 -0.98** -0.59 -0.48 
 (0.28) (0.48) (0.52) (0.44) (0.49) (0.47) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.21 -0.05 0.31 -0.19 0.37 0.16 
 (0.33) (0.46) (0.53) (0.43) (0.48) (0.57) 
%ΔY 0.06** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Trd Open 0.04*** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fin Open 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.14** -0.15 -0.22*** -0.11 -0.16* -0.14 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) 
Fr Res/Y -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.03***     -0.02** 
 (0.01)     (0.01) 
Fin Dev  -0.47     
  (2.46)     
Fin Inst   -5.83*  -7.23** -6.03* 
   (2.98)  (3.16) (3.42) 
Fin Mar    1.72 2.99* 3.75** 
    (1.69) (1.62) (1.81) 
Constant 10.47 19.19 9.09 26.27** 14.37 13.39 
 (7.90) (13.03) (14.68) (11.79) (14.01) (12.85) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.87 
Hansen  0.60 0.65 0.61 0.80 0.92 
N 1,279 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,279 
 
Note: The dependent variable is FDI liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, financial assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 4 
FDI Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies, 1981-2013 
 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) 
FDIL/Lbt (-1) 1.00*** 1.01*** 0.99*** 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln(Y) -0.51 -1.45*** -0.53 -1.56*** -0.97* -0.57 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.67) (0.52) (0.52) (0.66) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.52 -0.16 0.42 -0.09 0.22 -0.63 
 (0.73) (1.01) (0.88) (0.99) (0.82) (1.00) 
%ΔY 0.05 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.06** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trd Open 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fin Open -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03** -0.02* -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
U.S. Tr10 -0.30** -0.39*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.32*** -0.24 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) 
Fr Res/Y 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.03**     -0.03** 
 (0.02)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  2.62     
  (4.33)     
Fin Inst   -5.94**  -6.03** -3.55 
   (2.81)  (2.58) (2.44) 
Fin Mar    4.13 4.98* 6.10** 
    (2.95) (2.63) (2.88) 
Constant 20.31 41.51** 15.39 43.83*** 27.66* 23.03 
 (15.19) (16.40) (19.03) (14.36) (14.45) (17.01) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.36 
Hansen  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 662 672 672 672 672 662 
 
Note: The dependent variable is FDI liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, financial assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 5: 
Portfolio Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
PrtL/Lbt (-1) 0.89*** 0.78*** 0.85*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ln(Y) -1.27* -1.38* -1.31** -1.52** -1.33** -0.43 
 (0.67) (0.72) (0.62) (0.70) (0.66) (0.51) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.59 -0.10 -0.34 0.13 0.16 -0.52 
 (0.53) (0.55) (0.56) (0.50) (0.59) (0.87) 
%ΔY 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trd Open -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Fin Open 0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.30** 0.10 -0.14 0.05 0.07 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Fr Res/Y 0.09** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.02     -0.06*** 
 (0.01)     (0.01) 
Fin Dev  16.86***     
  (3.72)     
Fin Inst   8.40***  4.53 7.61* 
   (2.53)  (3.14) (3.93) 
Fin Mar    12.15*** 9.41*** 10.17*** 
    (2.22) (2.05) (2.28) 
Constant 42.15** 31.59 35.24** 36.82* 29.94 13.36 
 (19.54) (20.46) (17.89) (20.29) (19.07) (18.48) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.71 0.62 0.67 0.60 0.61 0.66 
Hansen 0.72 0.69 0.38 0.70 0.87 0.95 
N 1,279 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,279 
 
Note: The dependent variable is portfolio equity liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The 
explanatory variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 6: 
Portfolio Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies, 1981-2013 
 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) 
PrtL/Lbt (-1) 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ln(Y) 1.56 -0.30 1.02 0.28 0.32 1.42 
 (1.05) (1.22) (1.21) (1.10) (1.30) (1.02) 
Ln(Y/Pop) 0.64 0.72 1.44** 1.02 1.31 -0.13 
 (0.77) (0.87) (0.71) (0.88) (0.86) (1.00) 
%ΔY 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Trd Open -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Fin Open 0.03** 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
U.S. Tr 10 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.34* 0.34* 0.48** 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) 
Fr Res/Y 0.13* 0.12* 0.14* 0.11* 0.11* 0.09* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.02     -0.06*** 
 (0.02)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  19.08***     
  (5.72)     
Fin Inst   1.99  1.31 3.85 
   (4.60)  (5.73) (5.36) 
Fin Mar    13.92*** 13.07*** 14.10*** 
    (3.38) (2.95) (2.85) 
Constant -47.72 -4.65 -41.26 -20.51 -24.11 -41.32 
 (32.32) (31.02) (32.91) (30.75) (35.00) (30.65) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.14 
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 662 672 672 672 672 662 
 
Note: The dependent variable is portfolio liabilities/GDP multiplied by 100. The explanatory variables are 
the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of GDP/population, the 
growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes of financial development, 
financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for the 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are reported.   
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Table 7: 
Debt Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) 
DbtL/Lbt (-1) 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln(Y) 0.72 2.01* 1.64 2.10** 1.65* 0.54 
 (0.80) (1.12) (1.02) (1.02) (0.99) (0.84) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.11 -0.08 -0.42 0.18 -0.78 -0.18 
 (0.62) (0.61) (0.65) (0.55) (0.63) (0.68) 
%ΔY -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Trd Open -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Fin Open -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U.S. Tr 10 0.40*** 0.22 0.38*** 0.23* 0.26** 0.24* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Fr Res/Y -0.08* -0.08* -0.08 -0.08* -0.09** -0.11*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Dom Cr/Y 0.04***     0.06*** 
 (0.01)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  -9.29***     
  (3.04)     
Fin Inst   -0.61  6.79* 3.46 
   (3.06)  (3.81) (4.09) 
Fin Mar    -9.00*** -9.54*** -10.24*** 
    (1.92) (1.93) (2.27) 
Constant -16.75 -46.71 -38.84 -52.22* -33.97 -8.52 
 (23.16) (31.17) (28.84) (28.44) (28.11) (23.76) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.59 0.57 0.52 
Hansen 0.58 0.51 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.90 
N 1,279 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,279 
 
Note: The dependent variable is debt liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 8: 
Debt Liabilities/Total Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies, 1981-2013 
 
 (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) 
DbtL/Lbt(-1) 0.92*** 0.94*** 0.91*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ln(Y) -0.64 2.10** -0.13 1.67** 1.03 -0.28 
 (1.10) (1.07) (1.18) (0.83) (0.88) (1.02) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.06 -0.17 -1.84 -0.10 -1.21 0.33 
 (1.55) (1.28) (1.40) (1.19) (1.19) (1.50) 
%ΔY -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trd Open -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Fin Open 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
U.S. Tr 10 0.24 0.40** 0.35** 0.33** 0.27* 0.14 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) 
Fr Res/Y -0.16** -0.15** -0.16** -0.13** -0.14** -0.11** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Dom Cr/Y 0.06***     0.08*** 
 (0.02)     (0.02) 
Fin Dev  -14.23***     
  (5.01)     
Fin Inst   5.81  6.50 2.30 
   (4.30)  (4.19) (3.62) 
Fin Mar    -11.81*** -12.60*** -14.72*** 
    (2.85) (2.41) (2.44) 
Constant 21.63 -47.48 21.79 -38.28 -12.44 12.31 
 (37.32) (32.45) (41.16) (26.23) (27.50) (32.37) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.83 
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 662 672 672 672 672 662 
 
Note: The dependent variable is debt liabilities/total liabilities multiplied by 100. The explanatory 
variables are the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of 
GDP/population, the growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes 
of financial development, financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are 
reported.   
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Table 9: 
Equity Liabilities/Debt Liabilities: 
All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) 
EqL/DbtL (-1) 0.91*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.91*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ln(Y) -0.66 -6.60* -4.41 -7.70** -6.49* -2.03 
 (3.05) (3.61) (3.60) (3.55) (3.62) (3.10) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -2.28 -2.24 -0.62 -2.66 -0.15 -3.35 
 (2.44) (2.45) (2.83) (2.40) (2.81) (3.64) 
% ΔY 0.47*** 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.26* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) 
Trd Open -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
Fin Open 0.03** 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
U.S. Tr 10 -1.10** -0.38 -1.14** -0.39 -0.44 -0.12 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.47) (0.53) (0.47) (0.58) 
Fr Res/Y 0.49** 0.45** 0.43* 0.42** 0.45** 0.54*** 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.18***     -0.29*** 
 (0.05)     (0.08) 
Fin Dev  41.21***     
  (11.32)     
Fin Inst   1.75  -14.37 2.38 
   (12.37)  (14.10) (16.72) 
Fin Mar    37.85*** 36.03*** 38.87*** 
    (8.03) (8.09) (10.13) 
Constant 55.59 184.28* 129.48 223.87** 176.31* 92.19 
 (89.68) (101.97) (106.72) (98.98) (104.89) (89.33) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 
Hansen 0.60 0.50 0.68 0.50 0.81 0.91 
N 1,279 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,279 
 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/debt liabilities times 100. The explanatory variables are 
the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of GDP/population, the 
growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes of financial development, 
financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for the 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are reported.   
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Table 10: 
Equity Liabilities/Debt Liabilities: 
Emerging Market Economies, 1981-2013 
 
 (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) 
EqL/DbtL (-1) 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln(Y) 15.12** 0.68 9.10 0.89 3.88 3.88 
 (7.47) (6.18) (6.44) (5.28) (5.54) (5.54) 
Ln(Y/Pop) 7.88 8.93 14.83** 9.28 11.94* 11.94* 
 (9.08) (6.48) (6.37) (6.89) (6.36) (6.36) 
%ΔY 0.38** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Trd Open 0.03 -0.21 -0.17 -0.31 -0.34 -0.34 
 (0.26) (0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) 
Fin Open 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
U.S. Tr 10 2.40 0.63 1.25 1.02 1.41 1.41 
 (1.65) (1.12) (1.28) (1.06) (1.10) (1.10) 
For Ex/Y 0.74* 0.67* 0.76* 0.61* 0.62* 0.62* 
 (0.39) (0.35) (0.41) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.35***      
 (0.11)      
Fin Dev  55.62**     
  (22.92)     
Fin Inst   -26.66  -31.85 -31.85 
   (21.17)  (20.51) (20.51) 
Fin Mar    53.59*** 56.20*** 56.20*** 
    (13.50) (11.93) (11.93) 
Constant -466.36* -103.46 -353.86* -108.25 -200.59 -200.59 
 (254.72) (192.56) (207.73) (174.87) (182.03) (182.03) 
AR(1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 662 672 672 672 672       662 
 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/debt liabilities times 100. The explanatory variables are 
the lagged dependent variable, the logarithm of current GDP, the logarithm of GDP/population, the 
growth rate of real GDP, exports and imports/GDP, foreign assets and liabilities/GDP, the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury rate, foreign reserves/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, and indexes of financial development, 
financial institutions and financial markets. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols *,**,*** denote statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for the 
Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are reported.   
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Table 11: 
Equity Liabilities/Debt Liabilities: 
Macro Policies, All Countries, 1981-2013 
 
 (11.1) (11.2) (11.3) (11.4) (11.5) (11.6) 
EqL/Lbt (-1) 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (25.92) 
Ln(Y) -0.94 -1.08 -0.73 -0.59 -0.64 -0.73 
 (0.82) (0.77) (0.81) (0.79) (0.67) (1.06) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.79 -0.53 -0.35 -1.01 -1.12 -0.64 
 (0.81) (0.88) (0.83) (0.84) (0.81) (0.93) 
% Y 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (2.82) 
Trd Open -0.00 -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.45) 
Fin Open 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.27) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.23 -0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 -0.15 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.90) 
Fr Res/Y 0.12*** 0.11** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (3.58) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (4.36) 
Fin Mar 12.21*** 11.89*** 11.34*** 11.05*** 12.72*** 11.68*** 
 (2.24) (2.20) (2.67) (2.46) (2.39) (5.25) 
Inf 0.00      
 (0.00)      
Gov C/Y  -0.20     
  (0.14)     
Ex Reg   -0.21*    
   (0.11)    
Cap Acc    0.54   
    (0.35)   
Inv Risk     -0.29**  
     (0.14)  
Bank Cri      -2.04*** 
      (3.08) 
Constant 35.99* 41.91** 28.44 29.34 32.81* 28.72 
 (21.83) (19.74) (20.97) (20.31) (16.96) (1.53) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.25 0.25 0.92 0.27 0.33 0.21 
Hansen 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.95 
N 1,260 1,274 1,165 1,279 1,191 1,241 
 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/total liabilities times 100. The explanatory variables are 
those utilized in the previous tables, and the rate of inflation, the Reinhart-Rogoff exchange rate 
classification, the Chinn-Ito capital openness index, and a dummy for bank crises, and the ICRG index of 
investment risk. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote statistical 
significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation 
and the Hansen test for overidentification are reported.   
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Table 12: 
Equity Liabilities/Debt Liabilities: 
Macro Policies, Emerging Markets, 1981-2013 
 
 (12.1) (12.2) (12.3) (12.4) (12.5) (12.6) 
EqL/Lbt (-1) 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Ln(Y) 0.79 0.58 1.39 2.14** 0.79 0.66 
 (1.13) (0.84) (1.37) (1.00) (0.89) (1.15) 
Ln(Y/Pop) -0.68 -0.60 0.69 -0.52 -1.93 -0.04 
 (1.44) (1.89) (1.99) (2.06) (1.83) (1.70) 
% Y 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Trd Open 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Fin Open 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
U.S. Tr 10 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) 
Fr Res/Y 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Dom Cr/Y -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fin Mar 19.33*** 18.83*** 18.57*** 17.49*** 18.37*** 19.09*** 
 (3.41) (3.47) (4.02) (3.81) (3.70) (3.71) 
Inf 0.00      
 (0.00)      
Gov C/Y  -0.10     
  (0.12)     
Ex Reg   -0.29**    
   (0.13)    
Cap Acc    1.04***   
    (0.33)   
Inv Risk     0.29  
     (0.20)  
Bank Cri      -0.95 
      (0.93) 
Constant -13.06 -7.37 -37.68 -47.34 -3.32 -14.41 
 (28.39) (27.53) (35.75) (32.62) (26.35) (35.67) 
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) 0.94 0.93 0.38 0.83 0.97 0.98 
Hansen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N 660 657 599 662 622 641 
Note: The dependent variable is equity liabilities/total liabilities times 100. The explanatory variables are 
those utilized in the previous tables, and the rate of inflation, the Reinhart-Rogoff exchange rate 
classification, the Chinn-Ito capital openness index, and a dummy for bank crises, and the ICRG index of 
investment risk. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *,**,*** denote 
statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The p-values for the Arellano-Bond tests for 
autocorrelation and the Hansen test for overidentification are reported. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
 
List of Countries 
Emerging Markets 
Argentina Indonesia Peru 
Brazil Israel Philippines 
Chile Jordan South Africa 
China Malaysia South Korea 
Colombia Mexico Thailand 
Egypt Morocco Turkey 
India Pakistan Venezuela 
 
Advanced 
Australia Germany Portugal 
Austria Greece Spain 
Belgium Italy Sweden 
Canada  Japan Switzerland 
Denmark Netherlands United Kingdom 
Finland New Zealand United States 
France Norway  
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Appendix 
Table A2 
Data Sources 
Symbol Definition Source 
Bk Cr Systemic Banking Crisis (=1) Laeven and Valencia  
(2013) 
Cap Acc Capital account openness (higher values show 
more openness) 
Chinn and Ito (2006) 
DbtL/Lbt Debt Liabilities/Total Liabilities (%) EWN 
Dom Cr/Y Domestic Credit to Private Sector/GDP (%) FDS 
EqL/Lbt Equity Liabilities/Total Liabilities (%) EWN 
Ex Reg Exchange Rate Regime (1 – 13, higher numbers 
more flexible) 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) 
FDIL/Lbt FDI Liabilities/Total Liabilities (%) EWN 
Fin Dev, Fin 
Ins, Fin Mkt 
Financial Development, Financial Institutions, 
Financial Markets (0 – 1, higher values more 
developed) 
Svirydzenka (2016) 
Fin Open External Assets + Liabilities/GDP (%) EWN 
Fr Res/Y Foreign Exchange Assets of Central Bank/GDP 
(%) 
EWN 
Gov C/Y Government consumption expenditures/GDP (%) WDI 
Inf Change in Consumer Price Index (%) WDI 
Inv Risk Investment Risk (higher numbers show less risk) ICRG 
   
   
PrtL/Lbt Portfolio Liabilities/Total Liabilities (%) EWN 
Trd Open Exports + Imports/GDP (%) WDI 
U.S. Tr 10 U.S. 10-year Treasury Rate FRED 
%ΔY Annual growth rate of Real GDP (%) WDI 
Ln(Y) Logarithm of current GDP (dollars) WDI 
Ln(Y/Pop) Logarithm of GDP/Population (constant 2010 
dollars) 
WDI 
 
 
Note: EWN = External Wealth of Nations; FDS = Financial Development and Structure Dataset; 
FRED = Federal Reserve Economic Data; ICRG = International Country Risk Guide; WDI = 
World Development Indicators 
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Table A3 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Dev 
%Y 3.30 -13.45 18.67 3.58 
Bk Cr 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.17 
Cap Acc 0.65 -1.89 2.39 1.58 
Dbt L/Y 67.34 19.64 97.52 18.51 
Dom Cr/Y 63.28 2.96 212.90 40.60 
EqL/Lbt 31.64 2.47 79.09 18.08 
Ex Reg 8.21 1.00 15.00 4.07 
FDIL/Lbt 22.08 0.62 66.12 22.08 
Fin Dev 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.46 
Fin Ins 0.52 0.00 1.00 0.52 
Fin Mkt 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.40 
Fin Open 198.35 8.80 2070.95 231.27 
For Res/Y 9.59 0.10 72.38 9.57 
Gov C/Y 16.63 2.98 41.48 5.28 
Inf 32.72 -1.41 7481.66 245.72 
Inv Risk 8.11 1.25 12 2.43 
PrtL/Lbt 9.56 0.00 65.78 9.41 
Trd Open 60.98 12.01 220.41 33.12 
U.S. Tr 10 6.54 1.8 13.92 3.04 
Ln (Y) 26.20 22.15 30.44 1.48 
Ln (Y/Pop) 9.39 5.88 11.43 7.32 
 
